Although the burgeoning discipline of welfare economics is based on essentially utilititarian principles, the foundations of utilitarianism have received little attention in recent years. This paper seeks to reopen the debate by drawing a distinction between Harsanyi's two defences of utilitarianism, labeling the first a teleological or ideal-observer theory, and the second a nonteleological theory. It is argued that the modern consensus on political legitimacy requires a theory of the second type. The organizational role of the state is seen as being to enforce the laws that the people would make for themselves under ideally fair circumstances. Harsanyi's nonteleological argument employs Rawls' device of the original position to determine the nature of the ideally fair compromise, and finds the result to be utilititarian. However, the Kantian principles to which both Harsanyi and Rawls appeal leave the vital question of how utilities are to be compared unresolved. This paper abandons their Kantian defence of the original position, which is seen instead as a stylized version of a fairness norm that evolved along with the human race. The empathetic preferences that serve as inputs to the device are seen as being shaped by the forces of social evolution. These forces will tend to equip everybody with the same empathetic preference, which then provides a standard for making interpersonal comparisons of utility. The ideas offered in this paper are part of a larger scheme described in a two-volume work Game Theory and the Social Contract, of which the first volume has been published by MIT Press with the subtitle Playing Fair. Chapter 2 of Volume 11 expounds the same ideas in a more leisurely style.
A Utilitarian Theory of Political Legitimacy by Ken Binmore
He who would understand baboon would do more towards metaphysics than John Locke.
Charles Darwin
Introduction
The ideas offered in this paper are part of a larger scheme described in a twovolume work Game Theory and ihe Social Contract, the first volume of which has been published by MIT Press with the subtitle Playing Fair. The second volume Just Playing is in preparation. The paper is extracted from Chapter 2 of the second volume. The full chapter is available for readers who find the treatment of the current paper unduly terse.
Utilitarian Theories
Francis Hutcheson [22] argued that we should seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number (Scott [32] ). In an unguarded moment, Bentham2 repeated this formula, and hence provided the enemies of utilitarianism with a stick with which its advocates have been beaten ever since. However, unambiguous definitions are easily supplied in the case of a society of fixed size. I define a utilitarian narrowly to be a consequentialist with an additively separable common good function. He therefore adds together his estimate of the well-being of each citizen to obtain his measure of the welfare of society as a whole. Even within such a narrow definition, it is necessary to distinguish between a number of different types of utilitarian:
Ipsedixists.
Sen [34] denies that Harsanyi [19] is properly to be counted as a utilitarian at all, because his theories are based on what people want rather than on what they would want if they knew what was good for them. But how do we know what people ought to want? The literature is full of interminable lists of criteria that must somehow be distilled into the one and only true summum bonum, but these lists reflect only too obviously the cultural and class prejudices of their compilers. The past provides many examples. The Spanish Inquisition tortured and burnt heretics "for their own good". Until comparatively recently, desperately sick people were bled "for their own good". Victorian dogooders manufactured purpose-built, anti-masturbation harnesses into which pubescent children were strapped at night "for their own good".
Will modern dogooders be judged any less harshly by future generations? My guess is that a particularly bad press awaits those who believe that life is always an unmitigated good, and hence must be inflicted even on those whose suffering is so great that they beg for an easy death. Those who sabotage birth control initiatives for similar reasons have even less prospect of being remembered kindly. In brief, modern dogooders may be less barbaric then their predecessors, but the source of their inspiration is no more reliable. Mill [25] doubtless overstates the case when he says that all errors that an individual is likely to commit "are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good", but it cannot be denied that history has little positive to say about paternalists who ignore the wishes of those within their power. Bentham called them ipsedixists-those who offer their own moral prejudices in the guise of moral imperatives.
Ideal observers. An ipsedixist sees no reason why he should not seek to impose on others whatever conception of the Good is built into his own personal preferences. For example, Rousseau's [31, p.15] insists that the "general will" is not to be confused with the "will of all". As Rousseau [30, pp.255-260] explains, the former is known only to those of "sublime virtue" and so its objectives must be achieved by 'bringing all the particular wills into conformity with it".
However, utilitarians belonging to the more mainstream line take for granted that the standard for a common good should be impersonal. Instead of offering some dressed-up version of their own prejudices as the standard for a society to follow, they therefore propose that the preferences of some invented ideal observer should determine the goals towards which all members of a society ought to strive in common. If an ideal observer is entirely free of personal prejudices, then his preferences must somehow be obtained by aggregating the preferences of all the citizens in the society being studied. He then serves as an embodiment of Rousseau's "will of all". Utilitarians argue that the utility of the ideal observer for a given state should be obtained by simply adding the utilities of each citizen in the state.
Such a view leaves three questions open:
. What constitutes utility?
. Why should individual utilities be added?
. Why should I maximize the sum of utilities rather than my own?
Early utilitarians like Bentham and John Stuart Mill had little to offer in answer to any of these questions. With characteristic frankness, Bentham [3, p.615] says, "That which is used to prove everything, cannot itself be proved".
As for the additivity of happiness, this is quaintly described as a "fictitious postulatum". 3 Mill [26] sometimes endorses this position, but also offers a half-hearted attempt at providing a proof of utilitarianism. The proof consists of a chapter devoted to the claim that what people desire is happiness. Having established this proposition to his own satisfaction, he then rests on his laurels-apparently not feeling the need to tackle the second or third questions. 4 Modern moral philosophers writing in the utilitarian tradition seem largely to have lost interest in foundational questions altogether.
Fortunately, Harsanyi [19] is an exception to this rule, along with such followers as Broome [9] and Hammond [15, 16] . Although Harsanyi himself does not make this distinction, I believe that he is best seen as wearing two hats when writing on utilitarian subjects: a teleological hat and a nonteleological hat. In his teleological hat, he offers some foundations for the ideal observer approach to utilitarianism.
In his teleological mode, Harsanyi answers the first of the three questions posed above by interpreting utility in the sense of Von Neumann and Morgenstern. The players' utilities then simply serve to describe their preferences. The second question is answered by appealing to the intuitions we supposedly have about the nature of the Good, which is conceived of as some pre-existing Platonic form. Like Euclid, with his idealized points and lines, Harsanyi encapsulates his intuitions on this subject in a set of axioms. The axioms include the requirement that the ideal observer, whose individual good is to be identified with the common good, should be as rational as each individual citizen. If his expected utility for a lottery always depends only on the expected utilities assigned to the lottery by the citizens of the society he serves, the Von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms then guarantee that his utility function is a weighted sum of the citizens' utility functions (Binmore [8, p.281] ).
However, Harsanyi has nothing substantive to say when asked the third of the three questions. The existence of a common good whose advancement somehow takes priority over our own individual concerns is simply taken for granted. Once we have deduced the properties of this common good from his axioms, Harsanyi sees his task as being over. Nor do other teleological champions of the Good have anything on offer that might conceivably plug this large gap in their armor. They simply assert that we have a moral duty to carry out whatever sThi~ addabilit y of happiness, however when considered rigorously it may appear fictitious, is a postulatum without the allowance of which all political reasonings are at a standBentham [3, p.616].
4 All we are ofler~ on the second question is the observation: "Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness is therefore a good to the aggregate of all persons." actions are moral according to whatever theory is being defended.
Personally, I think it a major error for utilitarians to fudge the issue of why citizens should pursue the aims of some ideal observer rather than furthering their own individual interests. The question that needs to be decided is whether utilitarianism is a moral system to be employed by individuals in regulating their interactions with others, or whether it is a set of tenets to be followed by a government that has the power to enforce its decrees. It is understandable that utilitarians are reluctant to argue that their doctrine should be forced down the throats of people who find it hard to swallow. They prefer to imagine a world in which their thoughts are embraced with open arms by all the citizens of a utilitarian state. As with Marxists, there is sometimes talk of the state withering away when the word has finally reached every heart. On the other hand, most utilitarians see the practical necessity of compulsion. As Mill [25] puts it: "For such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected to social or legal punishment. "
My own view is that utilitarians would be wise to settle for the public policy option, which Hardin [17] refers to as institutional utilitarianism. If those in power are inclined to personify the role of the government of which they form a part, then they may be open to the suggestion that its actions should be rational in the same sense that an individual is rational. In a society with egalitarian traditions, Bentham's [4] "everyone to count for one, nobody to count for more than one" will also be attractive. If the powerful are persuaded by such propaganda, then Harsanyi's [19] teleological argument will then require that the government act as though it had the preferences of a utilitarian ideal observer.
Bourgeois liberals like myself will remain unpersuaded, but not because we are repelled by the idea that citizens need to be coerced into compliance. As long as someone is guarding the guardians, we see coercion as a practical necessity in a large modern state. Who would pay their taxes on time and in full unless compelled to do so? Even Hayek [21, p. 153] creates no difficulties on this score. Provided laws are framed impersonally, he is willing to say, "When we obey the laws . . . we are not subject to another man's will and are therefore free." There is therefore no reason why enforcement should be a painful issue for teleological utilitarians--provided that they are willing to grasp the nettle firmly by facing up to the intrinsic paternalism of their doctrine.
In summary, Harsanyi's [19] teleological defense of utilitarianism applies best to the problem that welfare economics sets out to solve. In its idealized form, a benign but paternalistic government asks what behavior it should enforce on the citizens subject to its authority. Harsanyi's answer makes sense when the government regards itself as an individual written large who is immune to personal prejudice.
Philosopher-king. So far, two forms of teleological utilitarianism have been considered. In both, an agency outside the system enforces a conception of the Good on those inside the system. The second differs from the first in insisting that the Good be determined in an impersonal manner. I use the word zmpersonaZ rather than zmpartiaZ to preserve a distinction made by Rawls [29, p.187 ], which will be important in the discussion of the nonteleological form of utilitarianism that is next on the agenda.
A truly impartial philosopher-king would certainly not want to impose his own personal conception of the Good on his subjects-but nor would he be willing to enforce some impersonal conception of the Good without a mandate from those he rules. He may perhaps agree with Harsanyi that priority should be given to the requirement that his actions on behalf of the state should be consistent with each other, but why should his personal view prevail? His subjects may well prefer to endorse some irrationality in his decision-making should this be necessary to ensure that no citizen is ever treated unfairly.
So what is the role of an impartial philosopher-king? Let us suppose him to be all-powerful but entirely benign. Let us also assume that he has no largesse of his own to distribute, all the productive potential of the state being vested in the hands of his subjects. His role then becomes entirely organizational. First he receives a mandate from the people to pursue certain ends, and then he insists that each person take whatever action is necessary to achieve these ends. In real life, people are only too ready to vote for an end but against the means for attaining it. However, in a rational society, people will accept that working together towards an ambitious goal may require some surrender of their personal freedom. Without a philosopher-king to police their efforts at self-discipline, the citizens would have no choice but to rely on their own feeble powers of commitment to prevent any free-riding. The ends that they could jointly achieve would then be severely restricted. But with a philosopher-king to enforce the laws that they make for themselves, the citizens of a society will have a much larger feasible set open for them to exploit.
Political legitimacy. The preceding account of the function of a philosopherking bears a close resemblance to the theory used by modern political parties with liberal pretensions to justify the actions they take when in power.
Edmund Burke, the Whig credited with being the founder of modern conservatism, did not see things this way. In a famous speech to the voters of Bristol, he expounded his version of the ipsedixist doctrine that someone voted into power is justified in pursuing his own personal view of what is best for his constituents even if it conflicts with theirs. The Marxist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat is an extreme ideal observer theory. The dictator is the ideal observer and the requirement of impersonality ensures that any aggregation of preferences will make him look like a proletarian in societies in which the proletariat is in a large majority. In modern times, neither of these extremes is at all popular. It is perhaps not even controversial to suggest that we are all social democrats now, paying lip-service to a theory of power which is essentially that of the phiZosopher-king.
I therefore think it of some importance that the application of Harsanyi's nonteleological ideas to the theory of the philosopher-king leads no less inexorably to utilitarianism than the application of his teleological ideas to the ideal observer theory. Barry [2, p.334] and Broome [9, p.56 ] are among those who see no reason why someone unconvinced by Harsanyi's [19] teleological theory of utilitarianism should change his mind when shown his nonteleological theory. The reply is that someone who does not lean sufficiently to the left to find an ideal observer theory attractive, may still be enough of a social democrat to be convinced by a philosopher-king story.
Empathetic Preferences
The previous section raised three questions for a utilitarian to answer: What constitutes utility? Why should individual utilities be added? Why should I maximize the sum of utilities rather than my own?
When passing from the ideal-observer theory to that of the philosopher-king, attention centered on the third of these three questions. It was unnecessary to renew consideration of the first question, because utility is to be interpreted in the sense of Von Neumann and Morgenstern in both types of theory. However, the second question was mentioned only in passing when discussing the idealobserver theory and not at all when discussing the philosopher-king theory. But it is important to recognize that Harsanyi's answer to the second question in an ideal-observer context will not suffice in a philosopher-king context.
To make this point, it is necessary to review Harsanyi's use of the idea of an empathetic preference. Empathetic preferences are identical to the extended sympathy preferences developed by Suppes [36] , Arrow [1] , Sen [33] and Harsanyi [19] . Adam is expressing a personal preference when he says that he would rather have a fig leaf to wear than an apple to eat. On the other hand, if someone says that he would rather be Adam wearing a figleaf than Eve eating an apple, then he is expressing an empathetic preference.
Modeling an individuals's empathetic preferences using a Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function vi is easy, provided one bears in mind that his empathetic utility function is quite distinct from his personal utility function u i . Let C be the set of possible consequences. Let {A, E} be the set consisting of Adam (A) and Eve (E). A personal utility function ui assigns a real number ui(C) to each C in the set C', By contrast, an empathetic utility function v i assigns a real number vi(Cj j) to each pair (C, j) in the set CX{A, E}. The number ui(C) is the utility the individual will get if C occurs. The number i(D, E) is the utility the individual would derive if he were Eve and D occurs.
To write ui(C) > ui(D) means that he prefers C to V. To write vi(C, A) > vi(D, E) means that he would rather be Adam when C occurs than Eve when D occurs.
The zero and the unit on Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility scales can be chosen at will, but then our freedom for maneuver is exhausted. To keep things simple while juggling with the utility scales, assume that everybody at least agrees that there is aworst outcome ~anda best outcome W in the set C of feasible social contracts. Perhaps Z is the event that everybody goes to hell and W is the event that everybody goes to heaven. We may then take uA(L)=uE(Z) =0 anduE(W) =uA(W)= 1. Such an arbitrary choice of utility scales is surprisingly often proposed asa means ofmaking interpersonal comparisons ofutility. But it isnot the method employed by Harsanyi [19] . He argues that if an individual is totally successful in empathizing with Adam, then the preferences he will express when imagining myself in Adam's position will be identical to Adam's own personal preferences. It then follows that the Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function uA and the utility function fiA defined by iiA(C) = vi(C, A) should represent exactly the same preferences. However, the Von Neumann and Morgenstern theory of expected utility tells us that two Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility scales which represent the same preferences can only differ in the location of their zeros and their units. It follows that
where a >0 and ~ are constant. Similarly, for suitable constants @ > 0 and 6,
Although the zeros and units on Adam and Eve's personal scales have been fixed, the zero and unit on the observer's empathetic utility scale remain undetermined. Somewhat arbitrarily, I fix this scale so that vi(Z, A) = O and vi(W, E) = 1. We are not free to meddle any more with the individual's empathetic utility scale. It follows that the two constants Ui >0 and ~ >0 defined by Ui = vi(W, A) and 1-~ = vi(~, 13)
tell us something substantive about the observer's empathetic preferences. Indeed, these two parameters characterize his empathetic preferences. To see this, substitute the four values vi(Z, A) = O, vi(W, E) = 1, vi(W, A) = Ui and i(~, E) = 1 -Vi into equations (1) and (2). The result will be four equations in the four unknowns a, @, y and 6. Solve these equations and substitute the resulting values for CY, P, Y and 6 back into (1) and (2) . We then find that his empathetic utility function vi can be expressed entirely in terms of the two parameters Ui and ~:
These equations imply that Ui of Eve's utils are equivalent to ~" of Adam's utils. Such a standard for comparing utils is intrapersonal rather than interpersonal. It is the observer's own idiosyncratic standard and need not be shared by anyone else. But it does not help very much that that we should each have our own private intrapersonal standards for comparing utils if we are unable to agree on a common interpersonal standard to be applied when joint decisions are made. Nor is social choice theory very encouraging about the possibility of aggregating our intrapersonal standards. Hylland [23] has shown that a version of Arrow's Paradox applies, and so the only aggregation methods that meet the usual criteria of social choice theory are essentially dictatorial.5 That is, one must pick some citizen and impose his standards on society. Such a procedure fits comfortably into an ipsedixist philosophy. The ideal observer approach can also be accommodated if the ideal observer is treated as an imaginary citizen. But this paper is devoted to exploring the notion of a philosopher-king who must derive all his standards from the people.
The Original Position
How do we go about making the rules for our philosopher-king to enforce? For many people, this question has an easy answer-the rules should be those endorsed by majority vote. But this is a naive response. In the first place, modern democracies have all kinds of checks and balances built into their structure to prevent the kind of folly that led Athenians to vote for an expedition against Syracuse while their city was under siege by the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War. Similar checks and balances serve to protect minorities against exploitation or persecution by the majority. Nobody would want to rewrite the constitution of a democratic state so that such restraints could be overturned on a mere show of hands. However, the main argument against treating majority rule as sacred is that part of the enterprise in which we are engaged consists of exploring the extent to which various forms of collective decision-making can be justified on more fundamental grounds. It would therefore defeat our purpose to assign a special role to some particular political mechanism. In brief, it ought to be a theorem that some issues should be decided by majority vote rather than an axiom.G Rawls [29] and Harsanyi [19] propose the device of the original position as a means of determining a fair system of rules for a society to adopt. To employ the device, each citizen is asked to envisage the social contract to which he would agree if his current and future role in society were concealed from him behind a veil of ignorance. In considering the social contract on which to agree under such hypothetical circumstances, each person will pay close attention to the plight of those who end up at the bottom of the social heap. Devil take the hindmost is not such an attractive principle when you yourself may be at the s Arrow~~ theorem js irrelevant in the later part of the paper, since the condition of unrestricted domain does not apply. 'However, it will be a theorem proved by someone analyzing much less abstract models of society than I consider in this paper. back of the pack. As Rawls argues, the social contract negotiated in the original position is therefore likely to generate outcomes that the underprivileged might reasonably regard as fair.
In modeling the use of the original position in later sections, attention is restricted to the case of two players, Adam and Eve. When they enter the original position they forget their identities. Adam will then be referred to as player I and Eve as player II. Behind the veil of ignorance, each player believes that there is half a chance that he will turn out to Adam and half a chance that he will turn out to be Eve. It is important to recognize that they cannot evaluate their plight in this situation unless they are able to quantify their empathetic preferences as described in Section 3.
I agree with Harsanyi and Rawls on the virtues of the original position, but I differ with both on two important counts. In the first place, I think their view that citizens are somehow committed, morally or otherwise, to whatever compromise would be achieved behind the veil of ignorance is mere wishful thinking. Without a philosopher-king available to enforce the compromise reached in the original position, it would be necessary to restrict the feasible social contracts to those that are self-policing. In game-theoretic terms, such contracts would need to be equilibria in the game of life. These issues are explored in Chapters 3 and 4 of Binmore [6] .
Secondly, and more importantly, I am unable to understand the reverance accorded to Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy, and hence remain unmoved by the appeals that both Harsanyi and Rawls make to to his authority in their respective defenses of the original position. For example, Rawls [29, p.256] argues that the original position provides a "procedural interpretation of Kant's concept of autonomy and the categorical imperative".
My own view, which is defended at much greater length in Binmore [8] , is that the interest of the device of the original position lies in the fact that it represents a stylized version of do-as-you-would-be-done-by principles that are already firmly entrenched as joint decision-making criteria within the system of commonly understood conventions that bind society together. It is distinguished from other versions by its power to answer objections like: don't do unto others as you would have them do unto you-they may have different tastes from yours. To advocate the use of a device like the original position is therefore not to call upon people to do something foreign to their nature or that lies outside their experience as social animals. All that is being suggested is that a familiar social tool be recognized as such, and then that it be adapted for use on a wider scale. The proposal is entirely pragmatic. If our evolutionary history had tabled some rival to the original position as a fairness norm, I would be proposing the use of this rival norm instead.
Taking such a naturalistic line on the nature of the original position creates opportunities for investigating the problem of interpersonal comparison of utility that Harsanyi's [19] Kantian approach finesses away. He postulates a very thick veil of ignorance, behind which people forget the empathetic preferences they have in real life and so find it necessary to adopt new empathetic preferences. He then appeals to a principle that has become known as the Harsanyi doctrine. In its extended form, the doctrine asserts that rational individuals placed in identical situations will necessarily respond identically. The empathetic preferences that Adam and Eve adopt in the original position will therefore be the same and the problem of interpersonal comparison is solved. Since Adam and Eve will be led to the same standard for comparing utils, no difficulties can arise in taking this as their common standard.
Binmore [8, p.210 ] criticizes the use of Harsanyi doctrine in such a context at length. However, even if its use could be adequately defended, how would poor mortals like ourselves be able to predict the empathetic preferences that rational superbeings would adopt behind the thick veil of ignorance envisaged by Harsanyi? Even if we could, why should we substitute these empathetic preferences for those we already have? My own approach is quite different from Harsanyi's. I think that we have empathetic preferences at all only because we need them as inputs when using rough-and-ready versions of the device of the original position to make fairness judgments in real life. Insofar as people from similar cultural backgrounds have similar empathetic preferences, it is because the use of the original position in this way creates evolutionary pressures that tend to favor some empathetic preferences at the expense of others. In the medium run, the result is that everybody in a society tends to have the same set of empathetic preferences.
Empathy and Fairness
Chapter 2 of Binmore [6] sketches a possible evolutionary history for the device of the original position as a fairness norm. Very briefly, it is argued that the origins of the device are to be found in primitive food-sharing agreements. If player I is lucky enough to have an excess of food this week, then it makes sense for him to share with player II in the expectation that she will be similarly generous when she is lucky in the future.
To see the similarity between bargaining over mutual insurance pacts and bargaining behind the veil of ignorance, think of players I and 11 as not knowing whether tomorrow will find them occupying the role of Mr. Lucky or Ms. Unlucky. It then becomes clear that a move to the device of the original position requires only that the players put themselves in the shoes of somebody else-either Adam or Eve-rather than in the shoes of one of their own possible future selves. The same distinction separates Buchanan and Tullock's [10] "veil of uncertainty" from Rawls' [29] veil of ignorance. Dworkin [12] similarly distinguishes between "brute luck" and "opportunity luck".
But what of the origins of the capacity to empathize with a fellow man rather than with a possible future self? On this subject, one has to look no further than the relationships which hold within families. In accordance with
Hamilton's [13, 14] rule, for games played within families, each player's payoff consists of a weighted sum of the fitnesses of himself and his kinfolk, with each weight equal to his degree of relationship to the relative concerned. For example, the weight that Adam will attach to the fitness of a first cousin is $, because they share this fraction of their genes. To express empathetic preferences outside the family, Adam therefore has only to adapt the mechanisms that evolved within the family to a new purpose.
However, a problem still remains. The weights we use when discounting the fitnesses of our partners in a family game are somehow obtained by estimating our degree of relationship to our kinfolk from the general dynamics of the family and our place in it. But where do we get the weights to be used when discounting Adam and Eve's personal utils when constructing an empathetic utility function? I see the empathetic preferences held by the individuals in a particular society as an artefact of their upbringing. As children mature, they are assimilated to the culture in which they grow up largely as a consequence of their natural disposition to imitate those around them. One of the social phenomena they will observe is the use of the device of the original position in achieving fair compromises. They are, of course, no more likely to recognize the device of the original position for what it is, than we are when we use it in deciding such matters as who should wash how many dishes. Instead, they simply copy the behavior patterns of those they see using the device. An internal algorithm then distils this behavior into a preference-belief model against which they then test alternative patterns of behavior. The preferences in this model will be empathetic preferences-the inputs required when the device of the original position is employed.
I plan to short-circuit the complexities of the actual transmission mechanism by simply thinking of a set of empathetic preferences as being packaged in a social signal or meme-which is Dawkins' [11] name for the social equivalent of a gene. The imitative process is seen as a means of propagating such memes in much the same way that the common cold virus finds its way from one head to another. To keep things simple, I assume that all games to be played are games of complete information, which means that the rules of the game and the preferences of the players are taken to be common knowledge. In particular, it is assumed that the hypothetical bargaining game played behind the veil of ignorance has complete information. The empathetic preferences with which the players evaluate their predicament in the original position are therefore taken to be common knowledge. Along with a set of empathetic preferences, a meme will also carry a recommendation about which bargaining strategy to use in the original position. Only when the stability of the system is threatened by the appearance of a "mutant" meme will they have reason to deviate from this normal bargaining strategy.
To explore the issue of evolutionary stability, imagine that all players are currently controlled by a normal meme N. A mutant meme Al now appears.
Will it be able to expand from its initial foothold in the population? If so, then the normal population is not evolutionarily stable.
Maynard Smith and Price [24] give two simple conditions for evolutionary stability, but only one of these is needed here: the condition that (IV, IV) should be a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the underlying game in which Al and N are strategies (Binmore [5, p.414] ). In brief, N must be a best reply to itself.
To interpret this condition, imagine that player I has been infected with the mutant meme ill while player II remains in thrall to the normal meme N. Both players will test their recommended bargaining strategy against the empathetic preferences they find themselves holding, and adjust their behavior until they reach a Nash equilibrium of their bargaining game. I shall be assuming that this Nash equilibrium implements a suitable version of the Nash bargaining solution of the game. As a consequence, player I and player II will each now receive some share of the benefits and burdens in dispute.
The imitation mechanism that determines when it is appropriate to copy the memes we observe others using will take account of who gets what. Onlookers will almost all currently be subject to the normal meme N and so will evaluate the shares they see player I and H receiving in terms of the empathetic preferences embedded in N. If player 1's payoff exceeds player 11 's, then I assume that onlookers who are vulnerable to infection are more likely to be taken over by the meme &l controlling player I than by the meme N controlling player II. But then M will be a better reply to N than N is to itself.
A necessary condition for the evolutionary stability of a normal population is therefore that the empathetic preferences originally held by players I and II constitute what I call a symmetric em.paiheizc equilibrium. In order to test whether a pair of empathetic preferences constitutes an empathetic equilibrium each player should be asked the following question:
Suppose that you could deceive everybody into believing that your empathetic preferences are whatever you find it expedient to claim them to be. Would such an act of deceit seem worthwhile to you in the originaZ position relative to the empathetic preferences that you actualiy hold?
The right answer for an empathetic equilibrium is no.
The tautological appearance of the argument leading to this criterion is misleading, since two substantive assumptions are concealed in the woodwork. In the simple two-person case with which I work, player I is actually Adam and player 11 is actually Eve. However, players I and II are envisaged as being ignorant of their identities. Each acts as though he or she may turn out to be Adam or Eve with probability +. In this state of imagined uncertainty, they evaluate their prospects using their empathetic preferences. Someone who imitates player II in the preceding argument therefore joins player 11 in pretending that he doesn't know that player II is Eve. The imitator therefore doesn't evaluate player II's payoff in terms of Eve's personal utils, as he might well do if he were looking on from outside the players' society without empathizing with what was passing through Eve's mind. He joins Eve in adopting player II's point of view and so interprets payoffs as player II interprets them. In the definition of an empathetic equilibrium, this requirement appears as the condition that a player only considers whether an act of deceit would be worthwhile to him in the original position.
This assumption is entirely natural in the case of prehistoric insurance contracts. It would then be stupid to wait until after the uncertainty was resolved to evaluate the decisions made before it was known who would be the lucky hunter. I know that people very commonly do make such stupid evaluations-arguing that it was a mistake to bet on Punier's FolZy because Gambler's Ruin actually won the race. The equivalent prehistoric mistake would be to judge that the lucky hunter went wrong in negotiating an insurance contract with his unlucky colleague, because he then had to part with some of his food without receiving anything in return. But tribes that implicitly internalized such reasoning would eventually lose the evolutionary race.
The second substantive assumption hidden in the woodwork concerns the syrnmefry of the empathetic equilibria to which attention will be confined. For the argument supporting symmetry to make sense, it is essential that everyone learns from everyone. If men only imitate men and women only imitate women, there is no reason why Adam and Eve's empathetic preferences shoud be the same. An essential precondition for confining attention to symmetric empathetic equilibria is therefore that all the citizens of a society share in a common culture.
Nonteleolological Utilitarianism
Section 2 argued that the modern consensus on political legitimacy is most closely matched by a philosopher-king theory. This section seeks to generate sound foundations for a philosopher-king version of utilitarianism by adapting Harsanyi)s [19] nonteleological approach to the purpose.
The theory depends on distinguishing between short-run and medium-run phenomena. The short run corresponds to economic time-the time it takes for a market to adjust to an unanticipated piece of news. I assume that all preferences are fixed in the short run. The medium run corresponds to social time-the time it takes for cultural norms or social conventions to adjust to a change in the underlying environment. I assume that personal preferences are fixed in the medium run, but that enough time is available in the medium run for empathetic preferences adjust until they are in empathetic equilibrium. If we had occasion to refer to the long run in this paper, it would correspond to biological time, and all preferences would be variable.
The Short Run
In the fable to be told, an impartial philosopher-king represents a benign and enlightened government that exists solely to enforce the laws that the people make for themselves. The state is simplified to the Garden of Eden, where the only citizens are Adam and Eve. Their problem is to negotiate a suitable marriage contract.
It is important to keep in mind that this is to be an old-style marriage, in that the philosopher-king will ensure that Adam and Eve remain bound by their marriage vows even though one or the other may beg for release after the gilt has worn off the gingerbread. He does not, of course, bind them against their will at the time of their marriage. On their wedding day, they want their vows to bind, because they know that that they will be tempted to go astray in the future. Nor does he impose the form of the contract upon them. He accepts that they will determine their marriage contract using the device of the original position.
All that will matter about a contract C in the analysis that follows is the fact that it generates a payoff pair z = (~A(C), UE(C)). Figure l(a) shows the feasible set X of all such contracts. The set X is assumed to be closed, bounded above, comprehensive and convex for the usual reasons. The asymmetries of the set X register the ineradicable inequalities between Adam and Eve for which the device of the original position provides the possibility of redress.
Behind the veil of ignorance, the players face an uncertain situation. They do not know which of two events, AE or EA, will be revealed after their negotiations are concluded. Because we chose the notation, we know that they will actually observe event AE, in which player I is Adam and player H is Eve. But the protagonists themselves must also take account of the event 23A in which player I turns out to be Eve and player 11 to be Adam. Unlike Harsanyi [19] , I allow Adam and Eve to come to an arrangement that makes the social contract contingent on who turns out to occupy which role. That is to say, they are assumed free to agree to operate one social contract C if event AE occurs and another social contract D if event EA occurs. This contingent social contract will be denoted by (C, D).
Suppose that player I's preferences are given by his empathetic Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function V I . His utility for the contingent social contract (C, D) is then In this expression, VI (C, A) is the utility player I derives if the social contract C is operated with him in Adam's role. Similarly, V1(D, E) is the utility he derives if the social contract 'D is operated him in Eve's role.
We have seen that a person who empathizes fully with both Adam and Eve has an empathetic utility function that can be expressed in terms of their personal utility functions uA and uE. Writing WI(C, D) of (5) W(D) )} , (6) w2(C, D) = ;{1 -V2(1 -w(C))} + ~~2~A(~) .
(7)
An aside on Harsanyi's approach. The considerations that lead to (6) and (7) are more complicated than Harsanyi [19] requires for his own nonteleological defense of utilitarianism. To reduce them to something recognizable in Harsanyi's work, begin by suppressing the irrelevant constants ;(1 -VI) and (1 -V2). Observe next that Harsanyi does not admit contingent social contracts, and so (6) and (7) can be simplified by writing C = D. Finally, recall that Harsanyi assumes that Adam and Eve will have the same empathetic preferences behind the veil of ignorance, with the result that U1 = U2 = U and VI = V2 = V. When these simplifications are incorporated into (6) and (7), the bargaining problem faced by players I and II in the original position becomes trivial, since each player then wants to maximize the same utility function. They will therefore simply agree on the social contract C that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function:
My difficulty with this version of Harsanyi's nonteleological defense of utilitarianism lies in the argument he deploys to ensure that U1 = U2 = U and V I = V2 = V. In order to guarantee that players I and II both agree in the original position that V of Adam's utils are worth U of Eve's, he proposes that the veil of ignorance should be assumed so thick that Adam and Eve forget their empathetic preferences along with their personal preferences. Each must therefore formulate new empathetic preferences in the original position. An appeal to the Harsanyi doctrine-which says that rational folk in identical circumstances will be led to identical conclusions-then guarantees that the empathetic preferences they construct are identical. However, Harsanyi offers no insight into the considerations to which players I and II would appeal in determining the weights U and V that characterize their new empathetic preferences.
My own approach is based on how it seems to me that the device of the original position is actually used in real life. If practice is to be our guide, then we must not follow Harsanyi and Rawls in postulating a thick veil of ignorance. On the contrary, the veil of ignorance needs to be taken to be as thin as possible. Adam and Eve must certainly still forget their personal preferences along with their identities, but it is essential that they do not forget the empathetic preferences with which their culture has equipped them. To isolate Adam and Eve in a Kantian void from the cultural data summarized in their empathetic preferences, and then to ask them to make interpersonal comparisons seems to me like inviting someone to participate in pole-vault competition without a pole.
The bargaining problem behind theveil of ignorance. Since Iam not willing to apply the Harsanyi doctrine in the original position, it is necessary to return to the asymmetric equations (6) and (7). These will be interpreted geometrically before applying Nash's bargaining theory.
The simplest type of bargaining problem can be formulated as a pair (T, r), where T consists of all payoff pairs on which the two players can agree, and r is the payoff pair that will result if there is a disagreement. Our first problem is therefore to determine the set T of feasible payoff pairs for players I and II in the original position.
Figure l(a) shows the set X of feasible personal payoffs pairs that Adam and Eve can achieve by coordinating on a suitable social contract. Behind the veil of ignorance, players I and II attach probability $ to both events AE and EA. Since they evaluate an uncertain prospect by calculating its expected utility, they regard a contingent social contract that leads to the payoff pair y when All occurs and z when EA occurs as equivalent to the pair t = ;y + ~z , (8) which is simply a compressed version of (6) and (7).
The payoff pair t is shown in Figure 2 (a). It lies halfway along the line segment joining the payoff pairs y and z. The pair y lies in the set XAE consisting of all payoff pairs that players I and II regard as attainable should AE occur. The set XAE has a similar shape to X, but needs to be resealed in order to reflect the relative worth that player I places on Adam's utils and player II places on Eve's utils. From (4), we know that player I regards a payoff of ~A to Adam as being worth yl = Ul~A. Similarly, she regards a payoff of ZE to Eve as being worth yz = 1 -V2(1 -ZE). To obtain XAE from the set X, we must therefore replace each payoff pair x = (~A, z~) in X by the resealed pair y = (Yl, Y2) = (U~ZA, 1 -V2(1 -ZE)). The resulting set .~A~ is shown in Figure   l (c).
To obtain XEA from the set X is slightly more complicated because player I will become Eve if EA occurs. However, his payoffs are measured on the horizontal axis while hers are measured on the vertical axis. As shown in Figure  l(b) , it is therefore necessary to begin by swapping over Adam and Eve's axes to obtain the set X' (which is simply the reflection of X in the line %A = %E). After this transformation, player I's payoffs and Eve's payoffs are both measured on the horizontal axis, and so we can proceed as before. The set XEA has a similar shape to X', but needs to be resealed in order to reflect the relative worth that player I places on Eve's utils and player II places on Adam's utils. To obtain XEA from X', replace each payoff pair z = (xE, ZA) in X' by the resealed pair z = (Z I , 22) = ( 1 -V1 ( 1 -XE ) , U2 ZA ). The set XEA is shown in Figure l(d) .
The preceding discussion of how XAE and XEA are constructed from X is a necessary preliminary to drawing the set T of all payoff pairs that are feasible Having tied down the set T, the next step in specifying the bargaining problem (T, ~) is to determine the status quo T. Chapter 2 of Binmore [6] describes how Nash's [28] variable threats theory can be used in principle to determine T. But such considerations are shortcircuited here by simply assuming that the alternative to their signing a marriage contract is that they revert to the preceding siatus quo represented in Figure I(a) as the payoff pair &=(&A,~E). This is mirrored in Figure l(b) by the payoffpairq= (~E,~A). Behind the veil ofignorance, players I and II therefore evaluate the consequences ofa disagreement as being equivalent to the payoff pair T = $q + ~< illustrated in Figure  2 (a).
Solving the bargaining problem. The bargaining problem faced byplayers Iand II in the original position has been formulated asthepair(T,~) ofFigure 2(a). It is easy to describe the solution to this bargaining problem in geometric terms. As illustrated in Figure 3 (a), Nash's [27] theory of bargaining with commitment predicts that the bargaining outcome will be the symmetric Nash bargaining solution aforthe bargaining problem (T',~). Before discussing what this solution implies for Adam and Eve's personal payoffs, it is as well to emphasize the strong informational assumptions required by the argument leading to the payoff pair u in Figure 3(a) . In the original position, players I and II forget whether they are Adam or Eve. Since their own empathetic preferences are common knowledge, it follows that they must also forget which empathetic preference derives from Adam and which from Eve. But everything else is assumed to be common knowledge between players I and II. This assumption is essential in the case of alZ the data used to construct the bargaining problem (T, ~). Players I and H therefore know the rules of the game of life, and hence which potential social contracts knows Adam and Eve's personal preferences, and his own together with those of his bargaining partner.
All this is a great deal to know and so it is worth are feasible. Each also empathetic preferences observing that a more general approach is possible that does not depend on making such strong epistomological assumptions. However, without strong informational assumptions, it is necessary to appeal to Harsanyi's [18] theory of games of incomplete information, with the result that the technical problems would become much harder. But there are no conceptual obstacles to an advance in this direction. 7 Returning to the question of how an agreement on o in the original position translates into personal payoffs to Adam and Eve, it is necessary to recall that for TThe Nash bargaining solution must be generalized as in Harsanyi and Selten [20] . A corresponding generalization of Nash's threat theory appea~ in Binmore [7] . c to be admissible as a member of the set T, it must be of the form a = $!/+ ;.2, where y is in XAE and z is in X EA . One must also remember that the bargaining that supposedly takes place behind the veil of ignorance is only hypothetical. Adam and Eve only pretend to forget their identities when using the device of the original position to compute a fair social contract. In fact, player I is actually Adam and player II is actually Eve. Of the two events AE and EA, it is therefore the former that actually obtains.
It follows that the social contract C which will actually be operated corresponds t. the payoff pair y = (y l , yz) in X AE illustrated in Figure 3(a) . In terms of Adam and Eve's original personal utility scales, the social contract C yields the payoff pair h = (hA, hE) defined by yl = U1h~ and ya = 1 -V2(1-hE). As far as I know, there is no neat way to summarize the payoff pair h in terms of the set X and the underlying game of life. However, matters become more promising in the symmetric case illustrated in Figure 4 (a). Figure 4(a) . In particular, the bargaining problem (T, r) becomes symmetric, and so the outcome
obtained by using the symmetric Nash bargaining solution is symmetric as well. The symmetry ensures that the payoff pair N can be achieved using the same social contract C whether All or EA occurs. However, the event that actually obtains is All and so the personal payoff pair h = (hA, hE) that Adam and Eve actually experience when C is implemented is given by IY1 = UhA and H2 = 1 -V(l -hE).
In the asymmetric case, it proved difficult to characterize the payoff pair h as a point of X. But here it is easily identified as the point z in X at which the weighted utilitarian social welfare function W~(Z) = U~A + VXE is maximized. To see this, observe that H and 1< in Figure 4 (a) lie on a common tangent Z1 + X2 = c to the Pareto-frontiers of XAE and X EA . It follows that H is the point in XAE at which the social welfare function WH(X) = Z1 + Xz is maximized. But the function defined by Z1 = UZA and X2 = 1-V(l -ZE) that maps XA E to X, transforms x 1 + X2 into UZA + 1 -V ( 1 -xE ). The constant 1 -V is irrelevant to the maximization, and so to maximize WH on .~A~ is the same as maximizing tt'~ on X. Provided that one is willing to swallow the assumption that U1 = U2 = U and V1 = V2 = V, the argument leading to h in Figure 5 (a) extends Harsanyi's nonteleological defense of utilitarianism to the case of contingent social contracts. In itself, such an achievement would not be worth the effort. But we need the apparatus developed along the way to tackle the question of how the parameters U1, U2, V1 and V2 are determined in the medium run.
The Medium Run
The preceding discussion is a short-run analysis in which all preferences are fixed. We now turn to the medium run, in which personal preferences remain fixed but social evolution has the chance to mould empathetic preferences. What will be the effect of the forces of social evolution on the values of U1, U2, V1 and V2 that determine the shape of the sets X~E and XE~ in Figure 3(a) ?
As Section 6.1 recalls, Harsanyi [19] makes a Kantian appeal to the Harsanyi doctrine in order to argue that U1 = U2 = U and V I = V2 = V. The same result is achieved equally cheaply here by restricting attention to symmetric empathetic equilibria. The argument of Section 6.1 is then adequate to demonstrate that Adam and Eve will call upon the philosopher-king to maximize the utilitarian welfare function
It is therefore entirely painless to translate Harsanyi's [19] nonteleological defense of utilitarianism into my naturalistic terms.
However, Harsanyi's appeal to his doctrine leaves us with no clue as to how the all-important ratio U/V is determined. If we were unconcerned about why the players think it appropriate to treat V of Adam's utils as being worth the same as U of Eve's, then Harsanyi's silence on this subject would create no problem. But the question of how interpersonal comparisons are made seems to me too important to be shrugged aside.
Although the relevant mathematics are suppressed in this paper, I believe that the fact that insight into this question can be obtained using the concept of an empathetic equilibrium is one of the major advantages of my approach. Chapter 2 of Binmore [6] demonstrates that, even for asymmetric empathetic equilibria, the personal payoffs that Adam and Eve receive as a result of bargaining as though behind the veil of ignorance are precisely the same as they would have gotten if they had solved the bargaining problem (X, ~) directly using the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. When allowed to operate in the medium run, the effect of social evolution is therefore to leach out all moral content from the device of the original position.
Morality as a Short-Run Phenomenon
We have just seen that the result of social evolution operating in the medium run is that Adam and Eve will get precisely the same personal payoffs if they play fair by using the device of the original position as they would if they were to bargain face-to-face with no holds barred. So what use is a fairness norm if it serves only to conceal the iron fist in a velvet glove? The answer is that the type of fairness with which we are concerned has its bite in the short run.
To understand how I see fairness norms operating in practice, one must begin by imagining that groups of people assembled in different places at different times for various purposes find themselves continually facing the need to coordinate on Pareto-efficient solutions to new problems. Such minisocieties are simplified in my treatment to pairs of men and women seeking some modus vivendi that I refer to as a marriage contract. In our Garden of Eden fable, Adam is therefore a representative man and Eve is a representative woman.
To keep things simple, it will be assumed that all pairs always face the same set X of feasible social contracts, and the same state of nature ~. Each Adam and Eve choose a social contract using the device of the original position. It will also be assumed that social evolution operates in the medium run to shape the manner in which Adam and Eve make interpersonal comparisons of utility. Eventually, everybody will therefore use the same weights U and V when comparing Adam's utils with Eve's. In the presence of a philosopher-king with the power and the inclination to enforce any social contract that Adam and Eve may write for themselves, the weights U and V can then be computed as shown in Figure 6 (a). The rules for this computation are:
(1) Find the symmetric Nash bargaining solution v of the bargaining problem (X, ~).
(2) Choose the weights U and V to make the weighted utilitarian solution for (X, ~) coincide with v.
Note that the influence of the status quo point ~. Although its location is irrelevant to the location of the weighted utilitarian solution v when U and V are given, it is not irrelevant to how U and V are determined in the medium run.
But what does it matter what U and V are, since we can determine the Nash bargaining solution v of (X, f) without their aid? The answer is that the values of U and V are relevant in the short run after some change in the underlying environment alters the set of feasible contracts. Perhaps some new innovation results in the set of available social contracts expanding from X to Y, as illustrated in Figure 6 (b). The fairness norm being operated now has a chance to fulfil the function for which it originally evolved-to shift its minisociety to a new Pareto-efficient social contract w without damaging internal conflict. In the short run, U and V remain fixed, and so the new social contract u is located as shown in Figure 6 Of course, if the representative problem faced by Adam and Eve continues to be (Y, ~) for long enough, then the standard for making interpersonal comparisons will adjust to the new situation and so the moral content of the social contract will again be eroded away. But it would be wrong to deduce that morality has only a small and ephemeral role to play in regulating the conduct of our affairs. If matters seem otherwise, it is because we mislead ourselves by thinking of morality as something to be taken out of its glass case only when grand and difficult problems need to be addressed. The real truth is that we use our inbuilt sense of justice all the time in resolving the innumerable short-run coordination problems that continually arise as we try to get along with those around us. Such coordinating problems are usually so mundane and we solve them so effortlessly, that we do not even think of them as problems-let alone moral problems. Like Moli&re's Monsieur Jourdain, who was delighted to discover that he had been speaking prose all his life, we are moral without knowing that we are moral.
%E (b>
Although I find few takers for the claim, I think the observation that morality works so smoothly much of the time that we don't even notice it working is of considerable significance. Just as we only take note of a thumb when it is sore, so moral philosophers tend to notice moral rules only when attempts are made to apply them in situations for which they are ill-adapted. One may compare their situation with Konrad Lorenz's observations of a totally inexperienced baby jackdaw going through all the motions of taking a bath when placed on a marble-topped table. By triggering such instinctive behavior under pathological circumstances, he learned a great deal about what is instinctive and what is not when a bird takes a bath. But this vital information is gained only by avoiding the mistake of supposing that bath-taking behavior confers some evolutionary advantage on birds placed on marble-topped tables. Similarly, one can learn a great deal about the mechanics of moral algorithms by triggering them under pathological circumstances-but only if one does not make the mistake of supposing that the moral rules have been designed to cope with pathological problems.
Finally, I doff the putatively descriptive hat I have been wearing up to now in this section and optimistically don a prescriptive hat of the type worn by Harsanyi [19] or Rawls [29] . We do not need to confine the device of the original position to the small-scale problems for which it evolved. We can deliberately seek to expand its circle of application by trying to apply this familiar social tool on a larger scale. That is to say, we can try to achieve Pareto-improving solutions to large-scale coordinating problems by appealing to the same fairness criteria that we use to solve small-scale coordinating problems. But such an enterprise will not work unless we put aside the temptation to romanticize our fairness intuitions. In particular, people make interpersonal comparisons of utility like they do-not as we would wish them to.
If my theory is anywhere near correct, appeals to fairness that ignore the realities of power are doomed, because the underlying balance of power is what ultimately shapes the interpersonal comparisons necessary for fairness judgments to be meaningful. Philosophers with utopian ambitions for the human race tell me that such conclusions are unacceptable. But I think this is just another example of an argument being rejected because it has unwelcome implications. In particular, the fact that fairness norms do not work like utopian thinkers would like them to work should not discourage us from trying to use them in the manner in which they actually do work. Others are free to toy with grandiose plans to convert our planet into a new Jerusalem, but bourgeois liberals like myself are content to aim at finding workable ways of making life just a little bit more bearable for everyone.
Retelling the Rawlsian story
This section briefly follows through the consequences of replacing Harsanyi's [19] use of Bayesian decision theory by the maximin principle favored by Rawls [29] . In doing so, the skepticism expressed in Binmore [8] about the reasons Rawls gives for making such a substitution is put on hold.
Section 6 must therefore be replayed with the assumption that a player in the original position proceeds as though whichever of the two events All and EA he dislikes more were certain to occur. Matters then proceed as in the reconstruction of Harsanyi's theory until equation (8) is reached. At this point, it is necessary to diverge from Harsanyi's argument because we are no longer to make the Bayesian assumption that player i seeks to maximize ti = $yi + ~ Zi. Instead, we must take the most pessimistic of all possible views, and assume that player i seeks to maximize t; = min{y~, z~} .
The payoff pair t = (tl, tz) defined by (10) is shown in Figure 2(b) The set T is easier to describe than in Harsanyi's case since (lo) it is simply the set of all payoff pairs that lie in both XAE and XEA. That is to s-ay, T = X AE n XEA. One may characterize r as the proportional bargaining solution with weights U and V for the bargaining problem (X, a), in which the status quo a is (O, 1 -l/v). Having replayed Section 6 in a Rawlsian style, it is natural to seek to do the same for Section 7. But the attempt fails, since it turns out that symmetric empathetic equilibria do not exist. This disappointing conclusion should come as no surprise. The meaningless location of the status quo in Figure 5 (b) already signals that something is awry-and the reason is not hard to find. One cannot expect meaningful conclusions if one grafts the maximin principle onto a utility theory for which only the maximization of expected utility makes sense as a decision principle.
However, I do not think the appropriate response is to lose faith in utility theory and to return to Rawls' [29] concept of primary goods. I believe that Harsanyi's [19] analysis of what rational players will agree behind the veil of ignorance is correct when a philosopher-king is available to enforce the rules they make for themselves. But the interesting case for constitutional questions seems to me to arise when no philosopher-king is available-so that any agreements made must be self-enforcing. Under such conditions, Chapter 4 of my forthcoming book (Binmore [6] ) puts what I hope is a strong case for Rawls' egalitarian intuitions.
